Anonymous
The further our nation drifts from traditional standards of morality, the stronger the impulse among faithful Christians for extreme measures. For some, this might include abandoning the American constitutional order in exchange for a benevolent dictatorship with sufficient power to save us from impending doom. According to intellectuals with similar sentiments, the principles of freedom and popular sovereignty upon which our nation was built were misguided and are the source of many of today’s problems.[1] Rather than attempting to reform a hopeless system, perhaps we ought to establish a monarchy obedient to God and committed to the common good, as counseled by the great doctor of the Church, St. Thomas Aquinas.
I propose an alternative interpretation of Aquinas with a more sympathetic approach to the American founding. Although Aquinas is somewhat unclear about what form of government is the best, the system of rule adopted by his own religious order offers promising insights into Thomistic political theory. Not only does it appear that Aquinas believes an American-like form of government is the best means of protecting freedom, understood as the ability to pursue that which is virtuous, but Aquinas himself was a participant in the political life of a working democratic republic. Furthermore, many elements of our constitutional order—insomuch as American government was inspired by the English tradition of representation and parliamentary system—can be traced back to the Dominican Order of Preachers, including an emphasis on freedom and popular sovereignty. In this paper, I suggest that the American constitutional order finds medieval precedent, inspiration, and sanction in Thomas Aquinas’ Order of Preachers, founded by St. Dominic in 1216.
I. APPARENT CONTRADICTION
There is an apparent contradiction in Aquinas about whether kingship or a mixed constitution is the best form of government. Passages within Thomas’ corpus, which state clearly that kingship is the best form of government, appear to contradict other passages where he says that a ‘mixed constitution’ is the best form of government. The 15th-century Thomist and political philosopher Francisco Vitoria points out this discrepancy in his work on law:
THE DOCTORS DISPUTE whether kingship is the best form of government. Aristotle says it is, and so does St Thomas in his commentary on the Politics (1288916 – 29) and De regimine principum 1.2. He holds the same opinion in ST I q.103, when he proves that the universe is governed by a single ruler, and in Summa Contra Gentiles v. 76, where he proves that the Church needs a single supreme pontiff because it is reasonable to say that Christ left the best sort of constitution in the Church.
BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, Aquinas is saying here that the best form is the ‘mixed’; and he repeats this idea above in ST I-II q.95 a.4. His opinions are therefore inconsistent.[2]
Since Aquinas is a careful thinker, it is highly unlikely that he is contradicting himself. Furthermore, reading the modern American constitutional system into Aquinas would be, quite simply, bad scholarship. A possible solution is that what Aquinas means by a ‘mixed constitution’ is something akin to constitutional monarchy rather than American-style representative government.
Comparison of the texts & textual argument
A careful analysis of De Regno makes the constitutional monarchy explanation quite plausible. In this work, Aquinas gives a plethora of arguments for why monarchy is the best form of government. In one place, he says it is “best for a human multitude to be ruled by one person” because that which is in accord with nature is best, namely that “every multitude is derived from unity.”[3] Just as a hive is directed by the queen and God governs the universe, men are best governed by a single ruler. Quoting a piece of ancient wisdom, he writes that just as kingship is best, so also is tyranny worst because what is contrary to the best is the worst.[4] Aquinas points out that “if the government should turn away from justice, it is more expedient that it be a government by many, so that it may be weaker and the many may mutually hinder one another. Among unjust governments, therefore, democracy is the most tolerable, but the worst is tyranny.”[5] It might appear that Aquinas’ view of democracy sees as inevitable the “tyranny of the majority” Tocqueville would later warn against in Democracy in America.[6] Furthermore, the very inefficiencies within the democratic system that would forestall tyranny would hinder the government’s duty to promote the “common good.” A democracy is clearly not the best in this respect.
Aquinas goes on to argue that “both the best and the worst is latent in monarchy” and that the rule of man is suspected and despised due to the possibility of abuse and the memory of past tyrants.[7] As a result, “danger lurks on every side… Either men are held by the fear of a tyrant and they miss the opportunity of having that very best government which is kingship; or, they want a king and the kingly power turns into tyrannical wickedness.”[8] The strongest objection to kingship is that it may devolve into tyranny.[9]For this reason, he suggests that “a scheme” of what would appear to be some form of constitutional monarchy “should be carefully worked out” to prevent the people from falling victim to a tyrant.[10]
However, Aquinas’ magnum opus, the Summa Theologiae, suggests that Aquinas favors a mixed regime that looks much more like America than we might expect from the Middle Ages. In Prima Secundae Partis question 95, he outlines the three forms of government laid out in Aristotle’s Politics and says, citing Isidore, that a combination of the three is the best form of government. “Finally, there is a form of government made up of all these, and which is the best: and in this respect we have law sanctioned by the ‘Lords and Commons,’ as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4, seqq.)” [my emphasis].[11] This appears to be a plan of governance more extensive than a mere constitutional monarchy, especially when seen in light of Aristotle’s writings on such a mixture.[12]
Question 105, article 1 strengthens this theory. In an unexpected about-face, Aquinas makes the bold assertion that “all should have some share in government.”[13] Here, he repeats his earlier claim that the “best form of government” is a mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.
Accordingly, the best form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is given the power to preside over all; while under him are others having governing powers: and yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are eligible to govern, and because the rules are chosen by all.[14]
A government where a single man (executive) “presides over” others who have powers of government (representatives) that are shared by all because “all are eligible to govern” is no constitutional monarchy. This sounds, rather, like a call for 18th-century democracy. Aquinas goes one step further, rounding everything off with the observation that this mixed constitution “was the form established by Divine Law” and, therefore, carries Divine sanction.[15]
Vitoria’s own response to this problem in Aquinas is worth considering.[16] He identifies which works of Aquinas are inconsistent and begins his response by offering us Cajetan’s solution.
I REPLY that the answer to this is twofold. First, Cajetan says that when the three constitutions are compared with each other, the comparison is made in formal and simple terms; of the three taken each on its own, Aquinas says ‘monarchy is the best’ because he is comparing each on its own to each of the others, simple to simple. But if two can be combined together, that will be better.[17]
Cajetan would say that monarchy is the best when each form is considered by itself, but a combination of two suitable forms will be superior. A combination of all three will be best. After noting that he does not believe this is what Aristotle meant, Vitoria gives his own answer.
We can reply in a different way, that there are two ways of speaking of these things: either simply and per se or with regard to circumstances and persons. For instance, prayer per se is better than almsgiving; but if the poor are dying of hunger, almsgiving will be better. So it is in the present case. As Aristotle says, if there exists a single man who excels all others in virtue and wisdom then monarchy will be the best form of government; otherwise it will be unjust (Nicomachean Ethics 1160b 1-11). “Only tell me who this man is, and we shall praise [him]. Likewise with regard to works: since princes do not always excel all others in wisdom, for the sake of peace among the populace other men are also chosen to fill the various posts…”[18]
Taken in its perfect form, monarchy is the best, for this reflects the government of God, which is unquestionably best. Yet in response to an objection that proposes kingship as the best form of government, Aquinas provides an answer for those who might question his consistency. He writes that monarchy is indeed best provided it has not become corrupted, but because the power given to such a man is so great, monarchy degenerates into tyranny unless one be of exceptional virtue.[19] In his Reflections on the Revolution in France, Edmund Burke notes that when it comes to government some things are true in the abstract that may be false when applied to circumstance and persons—in a world of imperfect men, “a good man is hard to find.”[20] It appears that this principle is at work here. Aquinas, Aristotle, and our own founding fathers alike recognized that those who possess this degree of virtue are very rare.
II. AQUINAS APPROVES OF AN AMERICAN-LIKE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
It may seem unlikely to some that when Aquinas speaks of a mixed constitution he is referring to an American-like constitutional system. The claim that Aquinas had in the 13th century already conceived of something resembling the American system might be thought of as an Americanophile’s weak attempt to give Aquinas credit for a system of government not conceived of until the 18thcentury. They might add that it would be absurd to credit a form of government to Aquinas that was unlike anything he could have experienced during his time. Just because the way Aquinas describes his mixed regime sounds like it could describe an American democratic republic government does not, by any means, suggest that he had in mind the highly complex system invented by our founders and brought into being by our constitution. Even if Aquinas did envision something in principle similar to the American constitutional order, it seems clear that the American government was inspired by Enlightenment ideas that would have been foreign to Aquinas. Aquinas was no revolutionary, nor was he an innovator. Since those proceeding him had not proposed a constitutional representative government grounded in popular sovereignty and designed with the particular intention of preserving liberty, it is highly unlikely that Aquinas’ idea of a mixed government resembles America in any meaningful way. This constitutes a formidable objection.
Response to Objection
When Thomas Aquinas was nineteen years old, he joined the newly formed Order of Preachers, established twenty-seven years earlier by the Spaniard Dominic, much to his noble Italian family’s chagrin.[21] This religious community was one of two new mendicant orders, the first of their kind, which had rapidly spread across Europe since their founding. Aquinas’ desire to become a religious was not the source of his family’s displeasure, since his parents were not opposed to him entering a religious community. In fact, they had prepared for him a prestigious position worthy of the family name as the abbot of the grand Benedictine Abby of Monte Cassino. The cause of this tension was that his family considered Aquinas’ plans to join the traveling bands of shoeless friars, who roamed from city to city preaching, to be sheer madness. His brothers chased him down and locked him up in one of his father’s castles for over a year. According to legend, they even sent in a temptress to persuade him to give up his fantasies, whom the resolute Thomas chased out with a fiery brand.[22] Nevertheless, Aquinas remained resolute in his determination to join this nascent order of poor preachers in white, and he did so at much personal cost.
The Dominican Order was the first of the modern religious orders.[23] While other orders of the time, such as the Benedictines, were confined to a locale and were ruled by a highly authoritative government, the Dominicans were an international religious community organized according to a complex democratic-republican system. The structure of government found in this religious order was, in many ways, a proto-America, both in organization and object. It had nearly all the forms characteristic of American government, including a ‘federalism’ of provinces and priories in relation to the larger government,[24] a system of state-supplied electors for election of the executive, [25] direct election of senators and representatives of the “voice of the governed,”[26] an executive distinct from the legislative body,[27] two-thirds supermajority,[28] provisions for a constitutional convention,[29] and constitutional ratification by three successive ‘states’ (reminiscent of ¾ ratification).[30] O’Brian describes the Dominican order as a model and working society with a healthy “centralized government” combined crucially with democratic spirit, representative institutions, and a clear-cut constitutional arrangement.[31] Aquinas was a voting member of this government, which he deliberately chose over that of the Benedictine order.
Prior Government of Religious Orders
The history of religious communities prior to the creation of the Dominicans is largely a story of Benedictine influence. The rule of St. Benedict and the concept of individual autonomous monastic communities spread quickly across Europe after their establishment in 529 AD. The new Cluniac reforms of the Benedictine order (910) and Cistercian monastic orders (1098) reacted to tendencies towards “parochialism and stagnation…by adding centralized authority to their Benedictine heritage.”[32] When urged towards reform by the Fourth Lateran Council and instructed to form a general assembly, the Benedictine communities complied, yet insisted upon retaining their traditional autonomy.[33] The Canons Regular, of which Dominic was originally a member, followed the somewhat more flexible (and more ancient) rule of Saint Augustine, the government of which resembled a “decentralized aristocracy.”[34]
To reverse the epigram of a distinguished student of canon law, it is easy enough to avoid anarchy by creating despotism. “The difficult task is to concede to a ruler all the very great powers needed for effective government while guarding against arbitrary tyranny.” If Cluny was monarchical, if Citeaux and Prémontré were aristocratic, authority in the Order of Preachers was exercised by a combination of electoral bodies, deliberative assemblies, and administrators.[35]
The Dominican Order marks a sharp break with precedent.[36] In contrast with the Benedictine system where a wise abbot rules the community, members of the Dominican brotherhood are all equal, and the community of brothers themselves are sovereign.[37]
Executive Trust and Popular Sovereignty
Within Dominican government, those elected by the brothers were understood merely to represent the “voice of the governed.”[38]Furthermore, the ruled brethren “embodied a right of opposition as well as consent.”[39] The order was governed by elected representatives held responsible to their constituents—the provincials and priors did not become autocrats once elected.[40]Executives had no power to make law but only to enforce it, and the brothers collectively bestowed upon their elected representatives the responsibility to administer the law and see that it was carried out.[41] Once their time in office was complete, the representatives returned to their previous status as a mere brother and nothing more. This innovation in sovereignty was even evident in the outward bearing of the new friars. They did not bow or prostrate themselves before their superiors as was the custom of the time.[42] For Bede Jarrett, author of the Life of Saint Dominic, his own Dominican Order is a model of a government where the “power of ruling was a gift held on trust by those who rule.”[43] Since its founding in 1216, the Order of Preachers appeared to embrace wholeheartedly the idea of popular sovereignty that would, centuries later, become the foundation for the American constitutional order.
Unique Motivation & Shared Goal
Perhaps even more significantly, the motivation for Dominican government was the same as the American rationale: freedom.[44] In this way, the Order of Preachers was unique in spirit, just as it was in organization.
It will be noticed at once how broad was its spirit of freedom and how deep its trust in the principles of democratic rule. It is clear, too, that it was precisely this love of liberty which St. Dominic himself bequeathed to his Order; nor is this wonderful when the search for truth is realized to be the purpose of his foundation. For truth itself, complete, intact, can never here be achieved.[45]
St. Dominic recognized the value of freedom in the pursuit of truth, something rather unexpected for the founder of an order dedicated to combating heresy. Everything about his order’s organization was directed towards this end.[46] Dominic believed in giving his brothers the great trust that accompanies freedom, as Pope Innocent III had done for him. In his mission, there was no place for blind obedience.[47] While other monks submitted to paternal power as the will of God in their lives, the friars were set loose upon the world, consumed with unquenchable fire and endowed with a spirit of freedom.[48]
For scholars of American history who follow in the tradition of Burkean conservatism, it is important to distinguish the French Revolution from the American War for Independence. Harvey Mansfield makes a similar argument, saying that it was the organic development of the U.S. Constitution (based on precedent and common law) and not the Lockian Declaration of Independence (based in abstract rights and theory) that reflects the heart of America.[49] In contrast, the establishment of the governing system of the Order of Preachers in 1216 stands out as an experiment that was the unique invention of St. Dominic. As historian Dennis Showwalter puts it, “Unlike so many medieval institutions, the Order of Preachers was not an organic growth, nor was its rule merely a regularization and codification of existing practices.”[50] If we consider Burke’s cautions about violent revolutions caused by governments created in the abstract, then the permeance of the novel constitutional system Dominic was able to put into place is really quite remarkable and is evidence of his brilliant statesmanship.[51]
Weakness of Democracy
A democratic republic is not without its weaknesses, including a strong propensity towards inefficiency, which Aquinas understood quite well. Throughout their history, the Order of Preachers has suffered due to the inefficiencies of its system of government,[52]just as the United States has with its own system. Yet if efficiency was the goal, Dominic would not have created the first great democratic-republican experiment. He would have chosen something closer to Aquinas’s most efficient government, or in this sense his “best” form of government: monarchy.
…[T]o those that live under its shadow, liberty in electing government is too blessed a thing to be put aside even at the risk of inefficiency. With all its inherent weakness, for them it mates better than any autocracy, however beneficent, with the independence of human reason and the strengthening of human will… Hence Dominic would himself, no doubt, willingly have admitted that a democratic system of organization might in certain cases prove terribly inefficient, and that it brought with it, despite certain excellences, certain great defects. Still in his eyes those excellences would appear to outshine their shadows, for the defects are defects in external work, but the excellences lie in the soul. Democracy may mar results, but it makes men.[53]
In addition to fostering a unique spiritual maturity, freedom offers the promise of action. Dominic realized that the Church needed a new approach to the conversion of souls and the fight against heresy. Rather than suppressing heretics with top-down authority, Dominic believed that the freedom to engage in argument was worth protecting and that the truth would win out in the end. He gave his brothers a system of government best suited for that mission.
Aquinas understands a “best” form of government in two senses: (1) that it is more efficient, and (2) that it is best suited to freedom, rightly understood. In an ideal world, a kingship under a perfect ruler would be both the most efficient and most free. However, in the real world, freedom comes at the expense of efficiency; in the name of efficiency, one will inevitably limit freedom. For the Dominican, freedom rightly understood (particularly the freedom to pursue truth) is a great and lofty good. Since man can never attain the fullness of truth in this life, there is value in free academic inquiry and danger in restricting this pursuit. Aquinas understands that a mixed constitution like the type found both in the government of his own Dominican Order and the idea that America is best suited to protect this freedom.[54] If Aquinas approves of the form of government of his own religious order (which he chose at much personal cost, over the Benedictines) and advocates for a mixed constitution (akin to his own order’s form of government), we can reasonably assume that Aquinas supports the idea of the American constitutional order both in principle and in object.
III. INDIRECT INFLUENCE ON THE AMERICAN ORDER
There is good reason to believe that the Dominican Order, of which Aquinas was a member, indirectly influenced America’s form of government. Shortly after its creation, the Dominican Order’s distinctive form of government began to influence the development of other representative governments in Europe. Two notable English noblemen, Stephen Langton and Simon de Montfort,[55] who were close friends of St. Dominic, had a major role in early English convocations. These representative assemblies comprised the origins of the English parliament and its distinctive bicameral legislature. If we believe Edmund Burke’s claim that the American government emerged organically from an English tradition of representation and self-government, then the American system is likewise heir to the Dominican heritage.
History of the Creation of the Order of Preachers
The history of Dominican representation begins in 1216 when St. Dominic organized his order. From the outset, the Order of Preachers had a fully developed representative system of government thanks to Dominic’s genius. The Order’s first chapter general meeting was held in 1220, which would have been similar to a constitutional convention in our American system. By 1221, the English Dominicans had established a priory at Oxford and rapidly expanded their aristocratic connections. In 1272, Robert Kilwardby, the new Dominican Archbishop of Canterbury, extended the Dominican principle of government to all of England by calling up proctors from each diocese for convocation.
The origins of the English representative principle are less apparent. In 1213, King John issued a writ summoning four nights from every shire to join a great council in which they were to discuss “the affairs of the kingdom.” As far as we know, this council never met.[56] Although this proclamation suggests a representative impulse present in England prior to Dominican influence, it is very different from a working representative government. It was not until April of 1226 that Stephen Langton, archbishop of Canterbury, called a representative council to discuss papal demands on King John.[57] Henry III succeeded in summoning four knights from each shire across the realm in 1254, and they did indeed meet to discuss granting money to the King, although the assembly had no law-making power of their own.[58] These same knights met again in 1261 to discuss “the common affairs” of the realm. In 1265, Simon de Montfort held his own parliament in London and called up (for the first time in English history) both knights of the shire and burgesses from the towns.[59] This appears to have continued with moderate frequency from this point forward. Edward I’s writ in 1275 summoning both knights and burgesses makes clear that he was following precedent.[60]
When it comes to the influence of English government and the Dominican Order upon each other we have a number of possibilities. First, it could have been the case that the Dominicans copied parliament. Second, parliament and the Dominicans could have both drawn from a common source. Third, what might have occurred is that the rise of national parliamentary representation in England was influenced by the Dominicans. Considering the historical timeline, it does not appear possible for the Dominicans to have copied parliament.[61] The second possibility seems to be excluded by the fact that the representative principle of the Dominicans, as well as its expression, has been recognized by historians as something altogether new, even if “the structures, the language, the concepts of the Dominican constitution were largely borrowed from contemporary canon law and political theory.”[62] If the Dominicans had the ear of the leading nobility during the advent of parliamentary representation in England, then it seems most likely that the their system of governance and the influence of their ideas would have served as catalyst for a principle of government similar to their own.
History of Influence According to Ernest Barker
Five years after the founding of the Dominican Order, Stephen Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury, headed the ecclesiastical “Council of 1226” in London for English church leaders to discuss a united response to the papal bull of Pope Innocent III, a groundbreaking event in the history of representation.[63] Since only members of communities living a common life were invited to this convocation, Dominicans exercised even more influence on the procedure and spirit of the council then they might have otherwise.[64] This first national convocation opened the doors to others which followed its precedents in subsequent years. In The Dominican Order and Convocation, Ernest Barker makes a thorough and convincing case that the convocation of 1226 was a predecessor to the English parliamentary system. In one place, he observes,
One may even suggest that the two Houses of Convocation may have been something of a precedent for the two Houses of Parliament, and have helped to produce that accidental bicameral system which, consecrated by time, has been defended as a theoretical ideal and imitated as a political model.[65]
Although the Dominican structure does not contain a distinct bicameral component, its presence in the first national convocation suggests a strong link between this event and the modern parliamentary system. In 1265, Simon de Montfort held his own convocation in London, which extended this principle to secular nobles in order to continue to check the king’s power—following the trajectory of previous initiatives like the Magna Carta (1215). There is strong evidence to suggest that Simon de Montfort had already summoned knights and burgesses to a council in Gascony, where he was governor from 1246 to 1252.[66] Both of these men were great friends of the Order of Preachers.[67] Dominicans also appeared to have a significant influence on the English nobility, especially as royal confessors during the reigns of Richard II, Henry IV, and Edward II.[68] The collective Dominican influence during this time in English history makes their influence on representative development a very real possibility.
Scholarship on the Franciscan Order’s Influence
The Franciscan Order first appeared in Europe nearly at the same time as the Dominican Order of Preachers. It was officially approved by Pope Innocent III in 1223, six years after Dominic made the unprecedented request not only for Papal approval, but also for authorization to preach in any diocese without needing the permission of the local bishop. After Francis’s death in 1226, the Franciscans modeled their government after the already vibrant Dominican system, founded in 1216.
Whereas Dominicans quickly fleshed out a streamlined and hierarchical system of representation between 1216 and the 1230s… the early Franciscans came to a comparable setup somewhat reluctantly… This led to a body of legislation in and after 1239, all of which was streamlined in the so-called Narbonne Constitutions from 1260, and their revision during the general chapters of Assisi (1279) and Paris (1292).[69]
It is important to note that scholarship on the Franciscan influence upon the development of representative government throughout Europe only furthers the Dominican claim.
Statistical Study of the Diffusion of Representation by Doucette
An empirical study published by Doucette in 2021 provides a unique insight into how representative governments may have spread across Europe in the late Middle Ages. This author studies the diffusion of representative governments across Europe using a newly compiled dataset of the vicinity of medieval cities to Dominican houses across Europe. The author was inspired by a previous study by Woodberry (2011), which found that Protestant missionaries positively influenced the spread of representation outside of Europe.[70]A similar mode of reasoning suggests that medieval religious orders played a role in the spread of representation within Europe.
Whatever the actual influence of representative bodies within religious orders on the secular world, it is a mistake to ignore them when discussing the emergence of representative institutions during the medieval period. The mere size and omnipresence of these orders, as well as their stature as near-independent international organizations, make that an untenable option.[71]
Doucette provides evidence that the Dominican religious order was crucial in determining the extent of this diffusion. As noted by others, the “Dominican Order provided a working model of representative government that could be emulated by local secular elites.”[72] Using a difference-in-difference design for his study, Doucette found that “representative institutions were more likely to emerge when the Dominican Order was present within a city.”[73]
To determine whether or not the relationship was merely associated with religious orders in general, Doucette used data on Franciscan presence as a control group. Interestingly enough, the Franciscan Order did not have a statistically significant effect on the development of representation, ruling out the possibility that the presence of religious orders in general made representative government more likely to emerge.[74] The author is careful to note that this study does not attempt to explain the “initial emergence of representative government, but rather its diffusion across Europe.”[75] Although representative governments were on the rise between 1100 and 1200, they occurred mostly in Italy, with only a few in France.[76] However, the greatest degree of growth in representative governance between 1200 and 1400 occurred in countries such as Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, Poland, and the Netherlands.[77] During this time, the presence of a Dominican priory in the city made it much more likely that the government would begin to adopt representative procedures.
Possible Influence on America
There are three ways in which the Dominican Order may have influenced the American constitutional order. First, it could have done so indirectly by example. If the Order of Preachers influenced the creation of the English Parliamentary system and the English government influenced the creation of American government (as Edmund Burke claims), then the American structure of government was influenced indirectly by the Dominican Order. Second, it could have done so indirectly through the influence of Dominican political theorists on other political thinkers. If the Dominican Order influenced the creation of other representative bodies in Europe, it also could have influenced political thinkers that the founders drew upon when drafting the U.S. Constitution (1787), such as Montesquieu and John Locke. Third, it could have influenced the American founders directly through the works of Dominican political theorists such as Aquinas and Vitoria. I readily admit that the founders most likely did not intentionally draw from Aquinas when they wrote the Constitution, nor would they have been interested in modeling their government after a Catholic religious order. Yet insomuch as the Dominican Order contributed to the development of the English parliamentary system, the Dominican example helped spread representation throughout Europe, and Dominican thinkers incorporated the organizational practices of their order into their political theory, it would seem that such an influence is highly plausible.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the American founders were influenced by Enlightenment ideas, and it is likely they were not directly interested in the thought of Thomistic political theorists. Yet the system of government they chose follows a tradition of representative self-rule that extends back into the Middle Ages. According to Edmund Burke, America was not an innovation, but rather a culmination of prior political movements that had been adopted over time by Englishmen in the form of increasing levels of representation. Tocqueville speaks of the Puritan influence on the origin of American democracy, but American-style democratic-republicanism pre-dates the Puritans. In fact, many of the intricacies of the American system, such as the idea of popular sovereignty, are, quite remarkably, prefigured in the government of the Dominican Order. Far from discouraging this form of government, Aquinas argues that it is, in fact, the best government to preserve the gift of freedom; perhaps it is also the best system of government man can devise on this side of eternity. So long as America maintains continuity with the tradition embodied by its constitutional order, it carries with it both the legitimacy of medieval precedent and the sanction of a Dominican heritage. Aquinas gives his blessing.
[1] Patrick J. Deneen, Why Liberalism Failed (Yale University Press, 2018), 1.
[2] Francesco De Vitoria, Political Writings (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 198.
[3] Thomas Aquinas, De Regno: On Kingship to The King of Cyprus (The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), 19.
[4] Ibid., 21–22.
[5] Ibid., 25.
[6] Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 241.
[7] Ibid., 30.
[8] Ibid., 35.
[9] Ibid., 40.
[10] Ibid., 41.
[11] ST I-II q.95 a.4.
[12] Aristotle/Carnes Lord, Aristotle’s Politics: Second Edition (The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 112.
[13] ST I-II q.105 a.1.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Vitoria, 198.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] ST I-II q.105, resp.2.
[20] Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, Vol. 2. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Incorporated, 1999), 154; Flannery O’Connor, A Good Man is Hard to Find, 1953.
[21] Joseph Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas (Ignatius Press, 1991), 11.
[22] Ibid., 12.
[23] Bede Jarrett, The Life of Saint Dominic (Burns Oates & Washbourne Limited: London, 1924), 117. “The full value of the statesmanship of St. Dominic is nowhere so apparent as in the organization and constitution of his Order. It is necessary to repeat what we have had occasion already to emphasize several times, that previous to his time there did not exist a religious Order in the modern sense of the phrase—i.e., a compact and corporate body with definite rules running through the whole and organized on lines which constituted it a perfect unity. Even the canons of St. Norbert and the Cistercians, who came nearest to that as an ideal, left so much discretion to the individual abbot, that the union of the monasteries was effected by the meetings merely of the abbots.”
[24] Ibid., 122-3. “Following the custom of Premontré and of the Knights Hospitallers, [Dominic] broke up the Order into provinces or nations which were themselves composed of groups of houses. Each house was to contain at least twelve religious, and to be governed by a prior; each gathering of priories (not less than three within the limits of a nation or kingdom) was ruled by a prior provincial; and the whole Order of linked provinces was administered by the Master General.”
[25] Ibid., 123–24. “The prior provincial himself is chosen by the votes of his subject priors and by one member of each community [called diffinitors], who is selected for this purpose. At the provincial chapter, which will shortly be described, the priors, then, are gathered, and with them each a socius, or companion (whom each priory has of its own free will, without suggestion or interference by its superior, sent to represent it).”
[26] Ibid., 125. “At the provincial chapter, held at first every year (subsequently every four years), there came together the priors from each house. These were, as has been seen, elected by the communities chiefly for their powers of administration. If to these alone had been committed the law-making power, it was feared they might favor authority at the expense of freedom. Hence with them came also a socius selected by the community, not for any governing capacity, but simply to represent in the assembly the voice of the governed. He was of importance only during the few days which the chapter lasted, and as soon as his labors were completed he sank back to his ordinary position of subordination.”
[27] Ibid., 124. “For along with the election of individual superiors must be recognized the system of legislation by chapters. These alone have the right to make and to unmake the laws of the Order.”
[28] Ibid., 123.
[29] Ibid., 127. “Each law had to be passed by three successive chapters before it became part of the Constitution, nor could a statute be removed from the Constitutions unless its removal were sanctioned also by three successive chapters. Thus, in every case there could be no undue nor hasty legislation forced through in a spirit of panic, nor could there be a law brought in simply in favor of, or at the expense of, authority, for a subsequent chapter composed either solely of provincials or solely of diffinitors would always be able to block it by refusing confirmation. The first reading was called an Inchoatio, the second a Confirmatio, the third a Constitutio.”
[30] Ibid., “Above the general chapter stood the Capitulum Generalissimum, which has met, however, only twice in the history of the Order, in 1228 and 1236. It stood as equivalent to three Chapters General, for it comprised the provincials and two diffinitors. Its decrees, therefore, at once had the power and binding force of a Constitution.”
[31] Nick O’Brien, “Bede Jarrett, Sir Ernest Barker and the Political Significance of the Dominican Order,” New Blackfriars 92, no. 1040 (2011): 464–83, 472. In Democracy In America, Tocqueville offers a distinction between administrative centralization (harmful) and governmental centralization (beneficial), which helps to illuminate this point.
[32] Dennis E. Showalter, “The Business of Salvation: Authority and Representation in the Thirteenth-Century Dominican Order,” The Catholic Historical Review 58, no. 4 (1973): 556–74.
[33] Ibid., 560.
[34] Ibid., 559.
[35] Ibid., 561.
[36] Harry P. Tunmore, “The Dominican Order and Parliament: An Unsolved Problem in the History of Representation,” The Catholic Historical Review 26, no. 4 (1941): 479–89, 483.
[37] O’Brian, 473.
[38] Jarrett, 124.
[39] Showalter, 561.
[40] Tunmore, 483. This uniquely Dominican governing principle was quite new for its time.
[41] Jarrett, 476.
[42] Tunmore, 483.
[43] Jarrett, 475.
[44] Ibid.; Showalter, 573.
[45] Jarrett, 127.
[46] Showalter, 573. “Organization, personnel policies, lines of authority—all were focused on this specific end. The Order of Preachers was functional.”
[47] Ibid., 560.
[48] That is, freedom “rightly understood.”
[49] Thomas G. West, “Jaffa vs Mansfield: Does America Have a Constitutional or a “Declaration of Independence” Soul?,” Perspectives on Political Science 31, no. 4 (2002): 240–41.
[50] Showalter, 561. “If the structures, the language, the concepts of the Dominican constitution were largely borrowed from contemporary canon law and political theory, the goals on which they were focused were quite different from those of either the universal Church or the emerging medieval state, with its public authority, public law, and embryonic nationalism.”
[51] Ibid., 560. Perhaps a source of the permanency of the order and its lack of division throughout the years (in contrast with the Franciscans) is that the first loyalty of the brothers from the very start was to the order (nation) rather than the province (state) or priory (township). This seems to be a solution to the problem of the American civil war. Yet when you consider that a nation needs to develop organically in order to last, Dominic’s order is clearly an exception to the rule due to the unique conditions of the men who joined, their state of life, and their supernatural mission.
[52] Jarrett, 128.
[53] Ibid., 129.
[54] Monarchy appears to be the most efficient form of government, while an American-style constitutional democratic-republic is arguably the least efficient. It appears that St. Dominic deliberately chose the least efficient form of government for the sake of the great good of freedom, rightly understood.
[55] This Simon de Montfort was the son of the crusading Simon de Montfort (also a close friend of Dominic), who died in 1218 during a battle against the Albigensians. He would often accompany his father on campaigns, and Dominic was his godfather. He went on to marry the daughter of King John (sister of Henry III), and was one of nine godfathers to the heir to the throne who would become Edward I.
[56] Tunmore, 479.
[57] Barker, 47.
[58] Tunmore, Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Tunmore, 480.
[62] Showalter, 561.
[63] Barker, 47.
[64] Ibid., 54.
[65] Ibid., 47.
[66] Tunmore, 484.
[67] Ernest Barker, The Dominican Order and Convocation (Oxford, 1913), 47.
[68] O’Brian, 474.
[69] Bert Roest, “Representative Bodies in Medieval Religious Orders: A Discarded Legacy?” New Perspectives on Power and Political Representation from Ancient History to the Present Day: Repertoires of Representation (2019), 44–46.
[70] Jonathan Doucette, “The Diffusion of Urban Medieval Representation: The Dominican Order as an Engine of Regime Change,” Perspectives on Politics 19, no. 3 (2021): 723–38, 2.
[71] Bert, 51.
[72] Doucette, 2.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid., 5.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.